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NOTES
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND REMOTE
SEARCHES: BALANCING THE PROTECTION OF
"THE PEOPLE" WITH THE REMOTE
INVESTIGATION OF INTERNET CRIMES
JERE MY A. MOSELEY*
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib-
erty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.... The great-
est dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.1
-Justice Louis D. Brandeis
INTRODUCTION
The preceding quote by Justice Brandeis adds caution to the
choice that the United States continually faces-greater protec-
tion by the government or greater freedom from government
intrusion. When confronted with this choice in the context of
the Internet, courts face another dilemma: To what extent do
government agents' actions over the Internet implicate the
Fourth Amendment? Professor Allan Stein provides the follow-
ing context to this choice: "Sovereignty is not just exercise of
power, but commitment to a particular legal order."2 Indeed,
one of the most considered questions with regard to Internet
jurisdiction is what country, if any, has the authority to regulate
the Internet.3 A system that transcends jurisdictional lines raises
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2005; ThomasJ.
White Scholar, 2003-2005; B.A., Pensacola Christian College, 2002.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing the majority's holding that wire taps were not a "search or
seizure" requiring a warrant). See infra notes 20-45 and accompanying text.
2. Allan R. Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness,
2001 U. CHI. LEcAL F. 373, 399 (discussing the problems ofjurisdiction related
to the investigation of international crimes).
3. Michael J. Madison, The Narratives of Cyberspace Law (or, Learning from
Casablanca), 27 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 249, 258 (2004).
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serious questions about national sovereignty.4 As this quote sug-
gests, the United States has more to consider than whether other
nations will find an exercise of power to be legitimate. Just as
important is what will "the people" say? The United States' com-
mitment to a particular legal order, a democracy within a repub-
lic, provides numerous questions with which the government
must grapple before an exercise of power over the Internet can
be considered legitimate. Relevant to the following discussion
are the questions of whether the Fourth Amendment protects
against government searches over the Internet ("remote
searches") and whether the location of the criminal affects the
Fourth Amendment's application to remote searches.
Remote searches present a unique combination of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and questions of jurisdiction. A
remote search involves accessing information from a remote
location.5 For example, a government agent in Virginia could
hack into a website located on a server in Kansas, or even Russia,
or the agent could retrace the movements of an Internet user
based on the Internet Protocol address in an attempt to deter-
mine the user's identity. When the agent finds the information
for which he is looking, he may download the data to his own
computer. In this instance, locating and downloading the data
implicates the Fourth Amendment's scope of a "search and
seizure" without the government agent ever physically entering a
constitutionally protected area. Further, the fact that the search
is remote can raise jurisdictional questions, especially because
the agent may not know the location of the end user he is
seeking.
Due to the remoteness of the search, jurisdictional lines are
easily blurred on the Internet. This blurring provides a unique
dilemma for the United States government. Because of the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment provided to the people, fed-
eral agents may have more latitude in pursuing crimes in other
countries than they have within the United States. At first
glance, if the government follows an international treaty when
pursuing international criminals, the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated. Trouble arises, however, when the criminal is inside
the United States. For, while the exercise of power is more legiti-
4. Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process
Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 411, 412 (2004).
5. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357,
404 (2003).
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mate, the scope of that power is now constrained by the Fourth
Amendment.
6
As criminals find new ways to use technology to threaten
America's safety, the initial public reaction seems to be a height-
ened fear of these more deviant criminals-as though the idea of
Internet crimes evokes an unprecedented evil that can destroy
our freedoms if not ended immediately.7 This fear leads many to
conclude that the government must have a greater ability to stop
criminals, even if this includes invasive procedures. However, as
Justice Brandeis warned, this fear should not compel Americans
to allow the government unfettered power to fight this new area
of crime. For even with new technology, Chief Postal Inspector
Lee Heath asserted that many of these crimes are simply "old
wine in a new bottle."8
In analyzing remote searches, this Note will discuss in Sec-
tion I how the Fourth Amendment has developed in relation to
new technology. Section II will address the ways in which the
scope of the Fourth Amendment is limited by jurisdictional ques-
tions. Finally, this Note will synthesize in Section III the develop-
ment of technology and jurisdictional questions by explaining
how courts should provide the necessary Fourth Amendment
protection from remote searches without limiting the application
of their decisions to today's technology.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
As with any technological development, the temptation
exists to allow law enforcement to employ the latest technology,
without contemplating the repercussions.' Yet this development
does not occur in a vacuum,10 as well it should not. In fact, the
protection given by the Fourth Amendment in the context of the
6. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World
of Internet Regudation, 43 VA.J. INT'L L. 605, 613 (2003).
7. Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity
and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405, 415 (2003).
8. Technology: Feds Nab 125 in Global Cybercrime Sweep, CNN, Nov. 21, 2003,
at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/11/21/crackdown.cybercfime.
reut/index.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
9. Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Exploring Identity and Identification in Cyberspace, 14
NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1085, 1103-07 (2000) (arguing, in the
commercial context, that because consumers demand the latest technology and
convenience without considering the accompanying loss of privacy the govern-
ment must regulate these invasions of privacy).
10. For example, the substantial connections requirement in immigra-
tion law has affected Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to remote
searches and has left open the possibility that only United States citizens can
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Internet can greatly affect both the direction of future techno-
logical developments" and the ability for these rules to govern
future developments effectively.12
Thus arises the problem that courts endlessly struggle with
when considering technological advancements: how to apply a
ruling based on past technology to current and future technolog-
ical advancements. For example, if a court applied a bright line
rule to the Internet as it was in 1993, the rule pronounced by the
court would now be ineffective because of how the Internet has
developed. Similarly, any rule articulated today could be useless
in a matter of years. Yet cases take years to decide, while technol-
ogy changes in a matter of months. The ways in which courts
have previously handled new technology demonstrate the
dilemma courts face with remote searches-adequately address-
ing today's technology with a protection guaranteed two hun-
dred years ago. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.' 3
A. Early History and Development of the Fourth Amendment
Traditionally, courts followed the textual meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and considered the protection of the home
to be the main purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 4 By requir-
ing both probable cause and a warrant before government offi-
cials can search an individual's house, the Fourth Amendment
restricted the government from conducting arbitrary searches.
Because this only prohibits "unreasonable" searches, courts must
balance the protection of privacy with the "promotion of legiti-
receive any protection from the Fourth Amendment. See infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the role government regulation should play in the
development of the Internet, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999).
12. See generally Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1275 (2002) (addressing the inconsistency of courts in applying
either a narrow ruling to Internet cases or a broad ruling and proposing a
framework for courts to determine which approach is best, particularly with
regard to copyright law).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
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mate governmental interests."15 Based on the maxim that a
man's house is his castle, courts considered this protection a high
priority.' 6 Because of its basis in this "castle doctrine," courts
strongly protected intrusion into the home but were more reluc-
tant to extend this protection beyond the home.
1 7 Yet, even
early cases recognized that the essence of the Fourth Amend-
ment was protection of people, not places. In Boyd v. United
States, Justice Bradley explained:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal secur-
ity, personal liberty, and private property.., it is the inva-
sion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes
the essence of [the] judgment.' 8
Even with this seemingly clear articulation of the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, courts were still reluctant to protect
areas outside of the home. Therefore, as technology changed
the methods for investigation, courts grappled with whether
these new methods even implicated the Fourth Amendment.
Not surprisingly, the last three decades, which have seen tremen-
dous advances in technology, have seen this provision litigated
more than any other clause in the Bill of Rights.
19
B. Change in Thinking with Improvements in Technology
The traditional view of the Fourth Amendment first encoun-
tered the problem of new technology in Olmstead v. United
States.2" Police employed new technology to tap phone lines at
the defendants' office building and their homes." Police, how-
ever, did not trespass on any of the defendants' property. In fact,
the taps were placed on the phone lines in the street near the
defendants' residences. The Supreme Court applied the tradi-
tional meaning of the Fourth Amendment and concluded that
15. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (holding coercive inter-
rogation tactics were constitutional when balanced against the governmental
interest in securing the witness's testimony while undergoing medical
treatment).
16. THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS: A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 365-66 (1883).
17. See infra notes 20-45 and accompanying text.
18. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
19. See generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987).
20. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
21. Id. at 456-57.
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the practical scope of the Fourth Amendment was "persons,
houses, papers, and effects." 2 Applying "searches and seizures"
to things heard or seen by the police did not fit under the Fourth
Amendment's protection and should thus be left to the Legisla-
ture to protect.2" While one may appreciate the Court's willing-
ness to defer to Congress, this traditional interpretation fails to
account for the implications of allowing technology to trample"personal security" and "personal liberty."24 Justice Brandeis, in
his dissent, exposed the flaw in the majority's reasoning:
In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contem-
plation cannot be only of what has been but of what may
be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be
as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy
and power. Its general principles would have little value
and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless
formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in
reality.
25
As Justice Brandeis warned, a declaration of rights is only as
effective as its application. Thus, following a bright-line rule of
what the Fourth Amendment protects ("persons, houses, papers,
and effects")2 6 can lead to the loss of any meaningful protection.
Justice Brandeis further noted that the government may some
day be able to reproduce papers in court without ever removing
them from secret drawers.2 7 Yet, such advancement in technol-
ogy should not affect the protection guaranteed to citizens.
Brandeis's comments, in some respects, foreshadow remote
searches. Had the ruling in Olmstead not been overturned later
by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment would now be an
"impotent and lifeless formula. '28
Fortunately, the next time the Supreme Court applied the
Fourth Amendment to new technology, the Court focused on
whether allowing the government's use of the technology was
reasonable. The Court again considered whether the Fourth
Amendment applied to federal agents listening to phone conver-
sations in Katz v. United States.29 Agents attached a listening
device to the phone booth that Katz was using and listened to his
22. Id. at 466.
23. Id. at 468.
24. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
25. Olrstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 474.
28. Id. at 473.
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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end of the conversation. 30 The lower courts followed the tradi-
tional approach and found no violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, because the agents did not physically enter Katz's
property. 3 The Supreme Court reversed.
In looking to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the
majority noted, "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
simply areas... "32 Though cases decided between Olmstead and
Katz had eroded the traditional approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment,3 3 the Katz Court finally overruled Olmstead.
4 In so doing,
the Court held, "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures."3 5 Because Katz intended to exclude others from hear-
ing his conversation when he entered the telephone booth, he
did not relinquish his right to private conversation simply
because the conversation took place in a phone booth instead of
in his house. The Court determined that advances in technology
meant that the presence or absence of physical intrusion into a
given enclosure could no longer be the deciding factor in Fourth
Amendment analysis.
Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion to articulate a
twofold requirement for extending Fourth Amendment protec-
tion: (1) the person must have a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy; and (2) the expectation must be one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable."3 6 This delineation of the
scope of the Fourth Amendment has been quoted often by subse-
quent courts to reiterate the principles embodied in the Fourth
Amendment."' In fact, this two-part test now constitutes the
30. Id. at 348.
31. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966), vacated by 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
33. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding that officers
did not need a warrant to enter the house minutes after a fleeing suspect
entered the house); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (finding
that placing a listening device in the defendant's home without obtaining a
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment).
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (O'Connor,J., con-
curring) (holding that an officer's observation of the interior of a greenhouse
from a helicopter was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986) (finding that the aerial observation of a
fenced-in backyard was not an unreasonable search); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 148-50 (1978) (holding that a passenger could not challenge the warrant-
less search of a car because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
another's car).
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required analysis for all Fourth Amendment considerations for
searches and seizures.
More recently, however, the Supreme Court wavered in its
protection of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment by adopt-
ing a bright-line rule in Kyllo v. United States.3" The question
before the Court in Kyllo was whether using a thermal-imaging
device to detect concentrations of heat within a house consti-
tuted a "search." 9 Specifically, police suspected Kyllo of growing
marijuana in his home.4 ° To verify their suspicions, police used a
thermal-imaging device to detect high concentrations of heat
emanating from the house.4 1 The high level of heat emissions
along one wall led police to believe that Kyllo was using halide
lamps to grow marijuana. Based on the information gathered
from the thermal-imaging device, police obtained a search war-
rant and found Kyllo growing marijuana in his home.42
Although a visual observation had never been considered a
search, the Court noted that the thermal-imaging device pro-
vided police with information that otherwise would not have
been obtained without entering the house.4 3 Because Kyllo had
a subjective expectation of privacy, protection turned on whether
this expectation was reasonable. The Court explained its hold-
ing: "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search-at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general pub-
lic use."4 4 The heat emanations provided information that
police could not have obtained without either using technology
or entering the house.
Although the Court sought to narrow the rule by adding a
caveat-technology not in general public use-the caveat limited
the application of this rule to present technology rather than bas-
ing it solely on the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. While, in
this case, the Court found that new technology was still subject to
the Fourth Amendment, the long-term effect could still be to
limit the effectiveness of this protection as technology becomes
more available. This reaction by the Court is evidence of the dif-
ficulty courts face in applying principles of law to new technology
38. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
39. Id. at 29.
40. Id. at 28.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 30.
43. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32-33.
44. Id. at 34 (internal citation omitted).
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without unintentionally limiting their application to current
technology. In his dissent, Justice Stevens explained: "Instead of
concentrating on the rather mundane issue that is actually
presented by the case before it, the Court has endeavored to
craft an all-encompassing rule for the future."" Yet, in focusing
on a rule for the future, the Court limited the usefulness of the
rule by making it dependent upon whether the technology is in
widespread public use-a consideration which should not be dis-
positive of Fourth Amendment protection.
For example, authorities can easily track one's movements
on the Internet. With remote searches, they can determine
whether illegal content is saved on a computer or whether the
content of the computer suggests other illegal activity. Even
many hackers can intercept and read email messages because of
the decryption software that is available. This technology is not
yet widespread. Yet the availability of such software, for hackers
or federal agents, should not determine whether one has an
expectation of privacy in computer content or email communica-
tions. Whether these searches or seizures are reasonable should
be based on what the Fourth Amendment protects, not on what
technology is available.
C. Wat It Means Now For Technology
Overall, courts have followed the principle of the Fourth
Amendment rather than a bright-line rule for Fourth Amend-
ment analysis.4 6 Rather than limiting their reasoning to present
technology by establishing rules that may become obsolete as
technology changes, courts, such as the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Bach,4 7 have followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Katz. In so doing, they have kept the flexibility in the Fourth
Amendment that is crucial to its ability to protect "the people."
In Bach, the court considered whether the seizure of emails
from Yahoo!'s servers constituted an unreasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.4 8 Based on information given to the
police by a concerned mother, police investigated users who had
met with the mother's minor child by tracing the screen name
that was used in Internet chat rooms. The police then obtained a
warrant for all emails connected to that Yahoo! screen name.
45. Id. at 51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens:
To What Extent Do They Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez ?, 56 Mo. L.
REv 213, 216 (1991).
47. United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002).
48. Id. at 1065.
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Because the servers were located in California and the investiga-
tion was in Minnesota, police faxed the warrant to Yahoo! and
asked for a copy of all of the emails from that screen name.49
The question before the court was whether it was reasonable to
allow a civilian (Yahoo!) to gather the information required
under the warrant without an officer being present. 50 The
Eighth Circuit held that the seizure was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment based on the following factors: (1) physical
presence of an officer would not have helped the search and may
have even hindered it; (2) "the technical expertise of Yahoo!'s
technicians far outweighs that of the officers; (3) the items'seized' were located on Yahoo!'s property;" (4) officers had
obtained a warrant authorizing the search; and (5) "the officers
complied with the provisions of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act.
51
While starting with the same two principles thatJustice Bran-
deis had established years before, the court used the preceding
factors to reach its conclusion. In so doing, the Eighth Circuit
avoided limiting the application of its decision to current tech-
nology. Additionally, the court quoted a prior Eighth Circuit
opinion stating that the reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment "is flexible and should not be read to mandate rigid
rules that ignore countervailing law enforcement interests."5 2
This understanding of the Fourth Amendment is especially cru-
cial when analyzing the intersection of remote searches and the
jurisdictional issues of applying the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE CURRENT LAW or CROss-BORDER AND
REMOTE SEARCHES
Just as technology has changed how courts determine what
constitutes a "search and seizure," the location of the govern-
ment action can also affect whether the Constitution applies. An
examination of how Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
applied to cross-border searches is necessary to understand how
the Fourth Amendment will apply to remote searches. The most
troubling areas of this application are with regard to United
States citizens abroad and to noncitizens without substantial con-
nections to the United States. Because courts apply the Fourth
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1066.
51. Id. at 1067.
52. Id. at 1067 (quoting United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 243 (8th
Cir. 1995)).
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Amendment to United States citizens and to noncitizens differ-
ently, these categories will be addressed separately.
A. United States Citizens Abroad
Fourth Amendment protection extends to the actions of
United States officials against United States citizens on foreign
soil.53 Based on the theory that the government derives its pow-
ers from "the people," the government's actions against the peo-
ple are constrained by the Constitution, regardless of whether
these actions are in the United States or on foreign soil. 4 While
every court starts with this premise, changes in the approach to
this problem indicate that these statements are now merely lip
service to the Constitution, rather than a meaningful constraint
on the government.
Even if United States officials follow the law of the foreign
country in which the "search and seizure" takes place, they must
still follow the Fourth Amendment if they are searching the
home of a United States citizen.5 5 The Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia considered this question in Powell v. Zuckert.
Powell's house was searched by United States and Japanese offi-
cials, pursuant to a general Japanese search warrant. Based on
evidence found in his house, Powell was discharged from the mil-
itary.56 The government agreed that the search would have vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment but argued that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply.57 The court considered whether the
Fourth Amendment applied to the actions taken by the United
States officials in a different country.58 The government claimed
that a treaty requiring cooperation between Japanese and United
States officials in investigations allowed the United States officials
to be present during the search of Powell's home by the Japa-
nese.5 9 The court determined, however, that United States offi-
cials did not merely observe the search; rather, they carried it
out.6' More importantly, the court quoted Reid v. Covert6 ' which
53. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
54. See Randall K. Miller, The Limits of U.S. International Law Enforcement
After Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin, 58 U. Prlr. L. REv. 867 (1997)
(discussing the theory of "connecting" individuals to the United States to deter-
mine who is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection).
55. See Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that a
treaty cannot authorize the United States to search the foreign home of a
United States citizen without probable cause).
56. Id. at 639.
57. Id. at 640.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 638.
60. Id. at 640.
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stated: "No agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on
the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is
free from the restraints of the Constitution."6 Thus, any action
by United States officials against United States citizens is con-
strained by the Constitution, regardless of the location.
In United States v. Peterson,63 the Ninth Circuit considered
what was required to make a search that was the product of a
joint investigation between United States and foreign officials
reasonable.6 4 Philippine and Thai authorities tapped the phone
line of a United States citizen and gathered information regard-
ing a shipment of illegal drugs into the United States.6 5 The gov-
ernment agreed that the actions of the officials resulted from a
joint investigation, and thus, the Fourth Amendment applied.6 6
To determine whether the search was reasonable, the court first
looked to the foreign law under which the wire taps were
obtained.67 Under Philippine law, the local officials did not
meet the requirements for obtaining a wire tap. Because of this,
the search did not comply with Philippine law and, therefore, was
not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.6 8
Failure to follow foreign law, however, did not end the
court's inquiry. The court noted that while Philippine law gov-
erned the search itself, United States law governed whether evi-
dence illegally obtained should be excluded.6 9 The focus of this
inquiry was whether excluding the evidence would deter federal
officers from unlawful conduct.v Following a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule, the court reasoned that the United
States officials reasonably believed that their conduct was legal
because they believed that Philippine officials had complied with
Philippine law in obtaining the wire taps.7 Thus, the conduct
that violated the Fourth Amendment was committed by foreign
officials. Because the United States officials believed the action
61. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (finding that a treaty's authorization
of power by the United States over a United States citizen is still constrained by
the Constitution).
62. Powell, 366 F.2d at 640 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 16).
63. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (1987).
64. Id. at 487.
65. Id. at 488.
66. Id. at 490.
67. Id. at 490-92.
68. Id. at 491.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 492.
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was legal, the violation could not be imputed to them under the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
72
A federal district court again allowed a good faith exception
for Fourth Amendment violations in United States v. Juda.73 In
Juda, the defendant planned to smuggle illegal drugs into the
United States."4 Australian officials installed a tracking device in
the defendant's boat, at the request of United States officials, to
track the boat's voyage to North America.75 The Australian
agents assured the United States officials that no warrant was
needed under Australian law to install a tracking device on the
boat.76 The court pointed out that, although a warrant from a
United States court would not have legal effect, it would provide
evidence of probable cause and would detail the scope of the
search v.7  The court noted, however, that procuring a warrant for
a search outside the United States is still a controversial issue that
many courts consider beyond their jurisdiction.7" Thus, the legal
compliance required in such situations is compliance with for-
eign law. 79 Because of the Australian officials' assurance that
their actions were in compliance with Australian law, the court
found, as in Peterson, that the search fell under a good faith
exception to the warrant requirement.8" In both cases, whether
the Fourth Amendment could provide any protection turned on
whether United States officials were conducting the unreasona-
ble search or seizure. As long as the United States officials did
not conduct the unreasonable search or seizure, they had to
prove only that they reasonably believed that the foreign officials
were following foreign law, regardless of how minimal that stan-
dard of foreign law may be.
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit considered how to apply the
Fourth Amendment to United States officials' actions overseas in
United States v. Barona.8 ' The defendants conspired to smuggle
cocaine into the United States.8 2 While they were in Denmark,
72. Id.
73. 797 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
74. Id. at 780.
75. Id. at 776.
76. Id. at 782.
77. Id.
78. Such an action may be viewed as seeking to project United States law
on other countries; whereas, the goal is simply to limit the actions of United
States officials, regardless of the location. Id.; see also FFD. R. CRIM. PRO. 41 (a)
advisory committee notes.
79. Juda, 797 F. Supp. at 782.
80. Id. at 783.
81. 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
82. Id. at 1089.
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Danish authorities tapped a public telephone near the hotel in
which they stayed.8 3 The court found that the investigation was a
joint venture between United States and Danish officials.84
Because of the joint investigation, the court considered whether
the search was reasonable by examining whether Danish law was
followed.8 5 The court ended its discussion of the reasonableness
of the search by concluding that Danish law was followed; there-
fore, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.8 6
Judge Reinhardt's dissent, however, points out that Danish
law does not require probable cause to obtain a wire tap.87 Even
though the investigation was a joint venture, United States offi-
cials were allowed to meet a lower standard than what is required
for obtaining a warrant in the United States. By looking solely to
foreign law to establish that the search was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, the court removed the probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, leaving it "without any
real force."8 8 Judge Reinhardt cautioned that foreign law has
gone from being a factor in previous cases to being determina-
tive for finding that a search was reasonable.89 In fact, because of
the good faith exception discussed in Peterson and Juda, United
States officials need only a good faith belief that foreign officials
complied with foreign law.9" This leaves a standard for the
Fourth Amendment that is lower than even foreign law
requirements.
Yet this was not the intent of the Peterson court. The Barona
court's focus on foreign law mischaracterizes Peterson. In Peterson,
the court noted that the Philippine law for obtaining a warrant
contained the same probable cause requirement.9 Therefore,
United States officials could reasonably believe that their actions
were legal, because they believed that Philippine officials had fol-
lowed their own law that required probable cause. In Barona,
however, the foreign law did not include a probable cause
requirement. Thus, federal agents could not reasonably believe
that a United States court would consider their actions legal.
Instead of noting this distinction, the Barona court allowed the
Fourth Amendment protection to be eroded further by allowing
83. Id. at 1090.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1095.
86. Id. at 1096.
87. See id. at 1099 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1090.
91. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (1987).
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foreign law, even without a probable cause requirement, to
become the standard. Allowing United States officials to follow
the lower standards set by foreign governments becomes even
more troubling in light of remote searches, which will be dis-
cussed in Section III.
B. Noncitizens Without Substantial Connections to the United States
The concept of "substantial connections" is grounded in
principles of immigration law.9 2 With respect to the Fourth
Amendment, however, courts have not yet developed what con-
stitutes a substantial connection to the United States.93 As the
following discussion indicates, it is not clear whether a noncitizen
can have substantial connections to the United States.9 4 While
the Fourth Amendment constrains United States officials acting
against United States citizens, even when the United States citi-
zen is not in the United States, courts have found no Fourth
Amendment protection from United States officials for nonci-
tizens, either in foreign countries or in the United States.
In United States v. Verdugo,95 the Supreme Court considered
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to United States officials
acting outside the United States against noncitizens. 96 Verdugo
was arrested in Mexico by Mexican officials and brought to the
United States. After his arrest, the Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") and Mexican officials searched Verdugo's home in Mex-
92. See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., The Rule of Law, Terrorism, and Countermea-
sures Including the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 16 FLA. J. IN r'L L. 43, 85 (2003).
Based on a theory that grants plenary power over immigration to Congress,
courts enter the realm of immigration law only when absolutely necessary. See
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that the author-
ity over immigration is an exercise of sovereignty vested in the executive
branch). Courts feel much more comfortable to point out the separation of
powers and the connection of immigration to foreign affairs, thus leaving most
decisions completely within the discretion of the executive branch. STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 121 (3d. ed. 2002). One
may have difficulty finding another area of law in which courts so willingly limit
judicial review. See Ryan Goodman & DerekJinks, Toward an Institutional Theoiy
of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1749, 1787 (2003); see also Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Alien, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century
Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1, 80 (2002).
93. Miller, supra note 54, at 882.
94. Arguably, a noncitizen with substantial connections to the United
States should receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment; however, all
courts that have considered this question have found that a substantial connec-
tion did not exist. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
95. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
96. Id. at 261.
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ico.9 7 Verdugo sought to have the evidence obtained from the
search suppressed, because the DEA did not have a warrant to
search his house.98 The District Court and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence should be sup-
pressed."9 The Ninth Circuit viewed the Constitution as the only
source of power for the government, making the Fourth Amend-
ment an absolute restriction on the government's power.' 0
Under this theory, it was of no consequence whether the power
was used in the United States or aboard, or whether the defen-
dant was a United States citizen or a noncitizen. In any circum-
stance, federal agents were limited by the Fourth Amendment.
Based on this reasoning, a grant of power given to foreign gov-
ernments by an international treaty would not aid the ability of
the United States to pursue criminals beyond its borders.
Because the Fourth Amendment follows U.S agents to foreign
lands, they still need a warrant to search a house in a foreign
country.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.'0 1 In reversing
the trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court looked to the
unique phrasing of the Fourth Amendment.0 2 While the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments refer to the "accused" and to a "person,"
the Fourth Amendment applies to "the people."' 0' The Court
considered this phrasing to be a term of art that applied only to
those with the power to form the government: those who had
socially contracted to be subject to its powers.' While the pro-
tections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied to everyone
in American courts, the Fourth Amendment applied only to
United States citizens, regardless of location. Until the Verdugo
court emphasized the wording "the people," the Fourth Amend-
ment was assumed to also cover noncitizens within the United
States.0 5 Now, the question of whether noncitizens within the
United States receive any protection from the Fourth Amend-
ment remains unanswered.
The Court also focused on the unique purpose of the
Fourth Amendment.'0 6 While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
97. Id. at 262.
98. Id. at 263.
99. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
100. Id. at 1217.
101. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 264.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 265.
104. Id.
105. Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 ViLL. L. REv. 1267, 1322 (1991).
106. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 264.
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protect a person at trial, the Fourth Amendment protects the
home or private property of the person. A Fourth Amendment
violation is fully accomplished at the time of an unreasonable
governmental intrusion, regardless of whether the evidence
seized is sought for use in a criminal trial." °7 By this distinction,
one can see that the Fourth Amendment's function is to protect
"the people" from their government. Hence, those who did not
provide the power to the government do not receive this protec-
tion from the government.1"8 Just as the foreign affairs doctrine
allows the executive branch virtually unlimited. power to interact
with other countries, denying Fourth Amendment protection to
noncitizens allows the government to interact with the interna-
tional community the same as any other foreign government
would interact. Thus, treaties affecting the ability of the United
States to conduct searches in foreign countries are not hindered
by the Fourth Amendment.
In determining who constitutes "the people" protected by
the Fourth Amendment, the Court looked at whether a nonci-
tizen had substantial connections to the United States.1 0 9
Because Verdugo's only connection to the United States was that
he was brought here and detained for trial, the Court did not
consider this a substantial connection. The Court suggested that
a substantial connection could only arise from a voluntary and
lawful presence within the United States." 0 The Court, however,
did not articulate any standard for determining what type of pres-
ence is voluntary or lawful for purposes of Fourth Amendment
protection."' The Court concluded that Verdugo's presence in
the United States was not voluntary; thus Verdugo was not a part
of "the people" receiving protection under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Court's emphasis on a term of art and the need for sub-
stantial connections to the United States has left open whether
anyone who is not a United States citizen can be considered one
of "the people.""' 2 If not, then whether the Fourth Amendment
would protect a noncitizen living in the United States remains
107. Id.
108. Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 667, 675 (2003) (arguing that immigrants are dissuaded from contacting
law enforcement because of the lack of constitutional protection).
109. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 271.
110. Id. at 271-72.
111. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HAuv. L. Rav. 129,
276-77, 281 (1990).
112. Cf Victor C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocu-
mented Immigrants: On Guitterez and the Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 35
I-HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57, 74 (2000) (discussing a district court's application of
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unsettled. The Ninth Circuit discussed this problem in
Barona.'13 Some of the defendants that were claiming United
States officials had violated the Fourth Amendment were resi-
dent aliens. The court pointed out that, based on Verdugo, resi-
dent aliens may not have sufficient substantial connections to
afford them Fourth Amendment protection.1 14 The court noted,
"[w] e could hold, therefore, that [the defendants] have failed to
demonstrate that, at the time of the extraterritorial search, they
were 'People of the United States' entitled to receive the 'full
panoply of rights guaranteed by our Constitution. """ Because
the court found that the Fourth Amendment was not violated, it
did not decide whether permanent aliens received Fourth
Amendment protection.
Additionally, in United States v. Gorshkov,1" 6 a federal district
court's interpretation of voluntary and lawful presence empha-
sized that these terms are not as self-defining as they first appear.
Gorshkov hacked into business computers from his computer in
Russia. After much investigation, the FBI set up a "sting" com-
puter company in Seattle. Gorshkov and another hacker flew to
Seattle to demonstrate their computer hacking ability to this
company. Gorshkov accessed his computer in Russia on the
laptop provided to him by these undercover FBI agents for his
demonstration. The FBI had installed a "sniffer" program on the
laptop to record all key strokes made by Gorshkov. After they
arrested Gorshkov, the FBI used the information from the laptop
to download files contained on Gorshkov's computer in Russia.
The FBI "seized" the evidence from the Russian computer with-
out obtaining a search warrant because of fear that a partner of
Gorhskov's in Russia would delete the evidence before the agents
obtained a search warrant.
The court considered whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to this "seizure," as well as whether the "seizure" was rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment. Based on Verdugo, the
court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
Gorshkov. Although his entry into the United States was volun-
tary, the court determined that one entry into the United States
"for a criminal purpose is hardly the sort of voluntary association
Verdugo's "indeterminate test" in United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997)).
113. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 1093-94.
115. Id. at 1094.
116. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-55-C, 2001 WL 1024026 (W.D.
Wash. May 23, 2001).
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with this country that should qualify Defendant as part of our
national community for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."
'117
The treatment of substantial connections in Gorshkov
emphasizes the loophole that the Verdugo court opened in apply-
ing the Fourth Amendment. If a lawful entry into the United
States is required, Verdugo would provide illegal immigrants with
no protection against unlawful searches.
1"' Yet the problem with
allowing this limit on protection is that, while searching the
house of an illegal immigrant, federal officials could easily violate
the rights of one who has a substantial connection to the United
States.1 19 Allowing a lower standard for anyone residing in the
United States could lead to more violations of the rights of
United States citizens.
Because of the problems in determining how the Fourth
Amendment applies to (1) new technology and to (2) citizens
and noncitizens not necessarily in the United States, applying the
Fourth Amendment to remote searches becomes even more diffi-
cult. Yet, if courts do not adequately address the complications
raised by remote searches, they may leave the Fourth Amend-
ment a hollow shell of protection that provides no shield for citi-
zens against unreasonable government actions. Due to the high
probability that federal officials will not know who is affected by a
remote search, courts must be extremely careful to limit the gov-
ernment's ability to conduct remote searches that are not subject
to the Fourth Amendment. For example, an official may know
that a particular computer is used by a noncitizen suspect. But if
the computer is also used by a citizen, the search would violate
the Fourth Amendment. For this reason, courts should apply the
protection of the Fourth Amendment to remote searches regard-
less of the technology that is employed by the government or the
criminal.
III. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO REMOTE SEARCHES
Remote searches present a unique combination of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and questions of jurisdiction.
Whether a remote search will constitute a "search or seizure"
depends upon the approach applied to technology. The ways in
which government action can be limited are also affected by
whether the investigation involves a foreign power or foreign
jurisdiction.
117. Id. at *3.
118. See Scaperlanda, supra note 46, at 241.
119. Id. at 242.
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A. Foreign Affairs
The first question raised is who has the jurisdiction to inves-
tigate international Internet crimes. Because many articles have
discussed the jurisdictional problem in depth, 2 0 only a summary
of these debates is necessary to provide the correct foundation
for international remote searches. Much debate has centered on
whether the nation affected most by the crime should be allowed
to seek enforcement of its laws beyond its borders. 2 ' Some
argue that the country in which the criminal is residing should
control any investigation within its own borders.'22 These
problems are magnified by the fact that most evidence of
Internet crimes can disappear rapidly. The country that has
been injured by a crime has started an investigation unsure
where the evidence may lead. Once the investigation leads to
another country, the investigating country may have to get
approval from that country to continue the investigation.
Understandably, most countries are leery of allowing foreign
governments to conduct searches within their own country, espe-
cially considering that different nations have different laws with
which they must comply during an investigation. Yet this takes
significant time during which crucial evidence may disappear. 123
The second consideration is what laws or regulations should
apply to the investigation.1 24 As discussed earlier, constitutional
limitations do not extend to the government's actions against
non United States citizens in other countries. Additionally, the
120. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35
(examining the principles of international law involved with the discussion of
Internet jurisdiction and arguing that any agreement with the United States
should comport with the Fourth Amendment); Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyber-
anarchy, 65 U CHI. L. Rv. 1199 (1998) (maintaining that Internet transactions
should be governed the same as any other transaction); David R. Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. Rrv. 1367
(1996) (arguing that a separate international jurisdiction is needed to govern
the Internet).
121. Bellia, supra note 120, at 79-80.
122. Stein, supra note 2, at 403-04.
123. Amalie M. Weber, The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, 18
BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 425, 427-28 (2003). To alleviate this problem, the United
States met with numerous European countries to propose a treaty that would
allow foreign investigation of Internet crimes in those counties which agree to
the treaty. Id. at 429. This pooling ofjurisdiction could greatly increase law
enforcement's ability to capture Internet criminals.
124. The treaty would alleviate some of these problems because it con-
tains provisions that are similar to the Constitution. Id. at 435. While discus-
sion of this issue may be more theoretical, this treaty has not yet been ratified
and later developments with conflicting jurisdictions may not necessarily start
from this baseline. Id. at 426.
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actions of foreign officials are not restricted by the Fourth
Amendment. Based on the current interpretation of the phrase
"the people," foreign officials could conduct an investigation in'
the United States free from constitutional restraint as well.'
25
The United States' commitment to a particular legal order
should eliminate this problem. For even if courts have left open
the possibility that foreign searches on United States soil need
not comply with the Fourth Amendment, policy considerations
should prevent the United States from entering into any such
agreement.
21
The cases addressing cross border searches reveal the will-
ingness of courts to find no Fourth Amendment protection, espe-
cially when a search involves foreign officials. The problem that
arises is that if federal agents do not follow the Fourth Amend-
ment while conducting searches in other countries, the United
States may not be able to expect the foreign government to fol-
low the Fourth Amendment while in the United States.
1 27
Legally, they may not have to. 12 8 The treaties into which the
United States enters could become more prevalent as technology
continues to add to the problem of jurisdiction. While well-
meaning law enforcement officials may constitute a dangerous
encroachment upon constitutional protections, well-meaning
foreign officials are an even greater threat.
The solution is to require a higher standard of all govern-
ment actors. To keep constitutional protections from suffering
at the hands of foreign governments, United States officials
should be willing at least to follow foreign law in other countries.
Instead, they currently just have to show that they believed the for-
eign government followed foreign law, not that it did follow the
law. Alternatively, United States officials should follow the
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the location or the subject of
the search. Otherwise, the United States may set a standard for
international investigations that falls short of how it is required to
act toward its own citizens. Such a situation could potentially cre-
ate even more problems for international investigations of
125. Cf D.C. Kennedy, In Search of a Balance Between Police Power and Pri-
vacy in the Cybercrime Treaty, 9 Rici-. J.L. & TECH. 1, 24 (2002) (discussing the
expanded investigative powers foreign states would enjoy under the Council of
Europe's proposed cybercrime treaty).
126. PeterJ. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1999, 2005-06 (2003) (examining the historical manner in which
constitutional fights have given way to foreign treaties).
127. Justin F. Kollar, USA PATRIOT Act, Fourth Amendment, and Paranoia:
Can They Read This While I'm Typing It?, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 67, 72-73 (2004).
128. Id. at 74.
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Internet crimes if other governments seek to investigate crimes
in the United States under these lower standards.
B. Domestic Policy
Jurisdictional questions do not pose the same problem in
domestic cases as they do in the international context. State offi-
cials may still struggle with this problem, but this is not an issue
for federal agents. The issue of substantial connections to the
United States, however, looms even larger in the domestic
arena.1 2 9 Federal officials often have no idea for whom they are
searching on the Internet or whose computer they are remotely
searching. Additionally, they may not know how many people
use the computer, or whether any of them have substantial con-
nections to the United States.1"' The best solution is to require
government officials to meet the same standard for all domestic
investigations, regardless of whether the subject of the search is a
United States citizen."3 A federal agent should not be allowed
to remotely search a computer without a warrant simply because
he believes that the person may not have substantial connections
to the United States. Even if a court may allow the evidence if it
turned out that no United States citizens had been unreasonably
searched, the potential for abuse against United States citizens is
strong.1 3 2 Additionally, a Fourth Amendment violation is not
dependent upon whether the evidence is excluded from trial;
the violation occurs at the time of the search. Thus, the govern-
ment's authority to conduct remote searches must be limited to
avoid violating the Fourth Amendment rights of a United States
citizen. Even though Internet crimes are harder to trace at this
time, Fourth Amendment protection should not suffer because
of this. Allowing current technology to limit the protection of
the Fourth Amendment by creating exceptions for remote
searches could eliminate Fourth Amendment protection from
future technology.
In applying the Fourth Amendment to remote searches,
courts must retain flexibility in the Fourth Amendment, rather
than following a bright-line rule. For example, the Gorshkov
court, in addressing whether the search was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, pointed out that the FBI had probable
129. Miller, supra note 54, at 875.
130. Id. at 886 (discussing the differences between the Fourth Amend-
ment protection provided to legal and illegal aliens).
131. Brett M. Frischmann, The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace,
35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 213 (2003).
132. Id. at 215.
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cause to believe that the evidence would be destroyed before a
warrant or assistance from Russian authorities could be obtained.
These exigent circumstances allowed for more latitude in seizing
data before obtaining a warrant. Additionally, the agents did not
examine the information they had downloaded until after the
warrant was obtained. 3 ' Therefore, the agents acted reasonably
to ensure Gorshkov's privacy until the judge issued a warrant.
Because the evidence could disappear if agents did not act
quickly, the seizure was reasonable."
34 The court's consideration
of these exigent circumstances reflects a flexible approach to
protecting the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
By focusing this portion of the opinion on the fact that the
evidence could disappear quickly, the court left open the possi-
bility that later technology could change this dilemma, thereby
eliminating the need for quick retrieval of the data. For exam-
ple, future technology could reduce the ability of criminals to
permanently remove information, or it may one day be easier to
track people over the Internet. If the court had determined that
the Fourth Amendment could never be applied in these circum-
stances, the government would have unfettered authority to
search over the Internet. This would be similar to the loss of
protection following the Olmstead decision in which the Fourth
Amendment was strictly limited to the home.
Unfortunately, the Gorshkov court also determined that the
Fourth Amendment still did not apply to the seizure because
copying the data did not interfere with the defendant's posses-
sory interest in the data.13 5 His control over his copy of the data
remained unaffected; thus, his rights had not been violated.
13 6
This section of the opinion fails to consider the advances in tech-
nology. In fact, Justice Brandeis, many years ago, discussed the
possibility that one day police may be able to produce secret doc-
uments without ever opening drawers.
137 Copying data over the
Internet certainly leaves the owner with unfettered access to the
original; however, the Fourth Amendment still protects people,
not places. Focusing on the owner's ability to control the origi-
nal data ignores the right to privacy that is violated by the agent
copying the data. The court's perception in the first issue and its
failure to address even present technology in the second ques-
133. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-55-C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *4
(W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001).
134. Id.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Id.
137. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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tion underscores the difficulty in applying the Fourth Amend-
ment to technology without creating a rule that will limit its
application in the future.
CONCLUSION
Our unique system of government is based upon the pro-
position that government should be limited to the powers that
are granted to it by the people of this nation.1 3 In fact, the Bill
of Rights embodies this proposition by ensuring that the federal
government understands what actions are beyond its power, of
which one action is unreasonable searches and seizures. While
new methods and new technology place the analysis of the
Fourth Amendment in different contexts, these new contexts
should not affect the protection provided to the people by the
Fourth Amendment.
Flexibility, rather than a bright-line rule, is the key to the
vitality of the Fourth Amendment. To adequately protect "the
people," regardless of the technology implemented, courts must
continue to focus on the principle of protecting "the people." A
narrow focus on a past court's application of the Fourth Amend-
ment while losing sight of the principles it sought to protect
leaves the Fourth Amendment impotent. While more intrusive
investigations may make the United States seem safer for a time,
allowing the fear of technology-savvy criminals to overrun per-
sonal liberty could emasculate the Fourth Amendment. With
changes in technology, the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
protection must change, as well, to maintain the proper balance
between the power of the police and the protection of the peo-
ple. As the United States Supreme Court cautioned, "It would
indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would
sanction the subversion of one of those liberties.., which makes
the defense of the Nation worthwhile."13 9
138. John Harrison, Forms of Oiginalism and the Study of History, 26 HARv.
J.L. & PuB. POL'y 83, 86 (2003).
139. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (holding that a stat-
ute which made it unlawful to be a member of a Communist organization and
be employed by a defense facility was unconstitutional as a violation of the free-
dom of association).
